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TESTAMENTARY REVOCATION BY DIVORCE
ALviN E. Ev&is*

Various methods of testamentary revocation have been discussed elsewhere by the present writer. For this occasion, consideration is given to revocation by divorce.'
It is not strange that there should be so little common law
on the matter in view of the traditional English attitude on
divorce, 2 and the problem from the standpoint of Anglo-American law is to be regarded largely as our own. In only two
American states has the legislature spoken positively and these
have declared that the will is revoked by divorce.3 In some
other states the opposite result has been reached in the decisions
interpreting a statute which purports to enumerate exclusively
all the methods of revocation.4
In still other jurisdictions, -we may assume that the problem
of revocation by divorce is not clearly settled by statute. It
may arise (a) where the testator is divorced from his spouse;
and (b) where divorce arises between a beneficiary and his
spouse.
(a) The divorce of the testator from a beneficiary spouse.
The question of the validity of a legacy may arise
* Dean, University of Kentucky College of Law; on leave 1935-36.
2 See 22 Ky. Law Jour. 469 (1934), Testamentary Revocation by
Subsequent Instrument; ib. 600 (1934), Revocation by the Adoption of
a Child; 23 Ky. Law Jour. 600 (1935), Testamentary Revocation by
Act to the Document and Dependent Relative Revocation.
'See 2 Jarman on Wills (7th, 1930), pp. 1224, 1253; 2. Williams on
Executors 706 (12th ed., 1930).
'See General Laws of Minnesota (1923), Sec. 8472; Donaldson v.
Hall, Infra, n. 19; Pierce's Code of Washington (1929), See. 10026;
Ziegner's Estate, 264 P. 12 (Wash. 1928); Peiffer v. ON Nat. Bank, 6 P.
(2d) 386 (Wash. 1932). (Statute operates retroactively.) See 14 Ia.
L. Rev. 1, 301 (1929).
' See Cal. Prob. Code (Deering 1931), See. 74; Patterson v. Patterson, 64 Cal. App. 643, 222 P. 374 (1922); Brannon's Estate, 295 P. 83

(Cal., App. 1931); General Statutes of Connecticut (1930), Sec. 4880;
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where there is a divorce simply or it may appear where there
has been a divorce accompanied by a property settlement.
There is no American case which holds that divorce
alone suffices as a revocation either of the entire will, or of the
provision for the wife, save those based directly upon a statute. 5
The earliest case found comes from Connecticut." An annuity
in lieu of dower had been given the wife and if she should refuse it, she was to have nothing under the will. It was the view
of the court that she should take and though divorce removed
the possibility of dower, yet the gift was not conditioned upon
the existence of the right of dower. No earlier authorities were
7
cited and the case was decided independently of the statute.
An earlier case from Ohios differs in that the will was executed
on the day of marriage, but before that event took place. The
court, in holding that divorce did not revoke the gift, laid stress
upon the proposition that the divorced wife neither lost nor
gained by the marriage, as the relation at the time of testator's
death was the same as it was when the will was executed. This
argument, however, seems to be without significance. If any
condition is to be read into a will by which the testator provides
for his spouse, that she shall continue to be his spouse until his
death, the same condition should be read into this will. In
(In Card v. Alexander, infra, n. 6 there is no reference to a statute
but the present Connecticut statute clearly prevents revocation In
this manner); Annotated Code of Ga. (Park 1914), Secs. 3918, 3919,
3921, 3923; Pacetti v. Rowlinski, 169 Ga. 602, 150 S. E. 910 (1930);
La. Civil Code Annotated (Dart. 1932), Sec. 1691; Successor of Cunningham, 142 La. 701, 77 So. 506 (1918); Texado v. Spence, 156 La. 1920,
118 So. 120 (1928); 4 Compiled Statutes of N. J. (1910), pp. 58615770; Murphy v. Markis, 98 N. J. Eq. 153, 130 A. 840 (1925)-Afmrmed
(132 A. 923); Pa. Statutes (1920), Sees. 8332, 8333; Iz
e Jones,
211 Pa. 364, 60 A. 915, 69 L. R. A. 940, 107 A. S. R. 581 (1905); Compiled Laws of So. Dakota (1929), Sec. 623; Nenaber's Estate, 226 N. W.
719 (S. D. 1929); 5 Wis. L. R. 377 (1930). Morris' Estate, 22 Pa. Dist.
R. 466 (1913), contra. Cf. Brown v. Grand Lodge, 208 Pa. 101, 57 A. 176
(1904) (Insurance policy proceeds payable "to my wife M,,' proceeds
go to divorced wife, though insured had remarried); but see Be Lee's
Estate, 207 Pa. 218,56 A. 425 (1903) (a trust created for T's daughter,
to terminate on the death of her husband, was held to terminate on
divorce from him).
OMorris' Estate, supra, n. 4; Ziegener's Estate, supra, n. 3.
8
Card v. Alexander, 48 Conn. 492 (1381).
"That the problem is a late one is further suggested by the fact
that it is not mentioned by Kent nor by Redfield on Wills (4th ed.
1876) nor by O'Hara's Edition of Wigram on Wills (1872).
8 Charltonv. Miller, 27 Oh. St. 298 (1875).
Cf. also the later case,
Ziegener's Estate, supra, n. 3.
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many states there is no statute which necessarily stands in the
way of revocation by divorce. 9 If, instead of divorce, the marriage is avoided for impotency or other reason, still a legacy
to testator's wife is not revoked by the avoidance of the marriage. 10 There appears to be no valid distinction between annullment of the marriage and a divorce.
PROPERTY SETTLEMENT

Many states hold, however, that a different result accrues
where the divorce is accompanied by a property settlement or
where alimony is granted on divorce. In one case it was held
that when the wife failed to demand alimony, such failure was
equivalent to a settlement or grant of alimony at the time of the
divorce." The first decision relied upon the statutory provision,
"Nothing herein shall be construed to prevent revocation implied at law." '12 It was a case where the equities favored
revocation, the wife having received one-half of the estate at the
settlement. The court declared, in effect, that an implication of
revocation was not limited by the circumstances that had
developed in England prior to the American revolution and that
changed social and moral relations may still develop additional
conditions of implied revocation. This precedent has been consistently followed.' 3 Nebraska, having a similar statute, has
held that the divorce alone does not entirely revoke a will.14
SBaacke v. Baacke, 50 Nebr. 18, 69 N. W. 303 (1896); In Re
Brown'8 Estate, 139 Ia. 219, 117 N. W. 260 (1908) (divorce and almony); Oharlton. v. Miller, supra, n.8; Pardee v.Grsubiss, 34 Oh.App.
474, 10171 N. E. 375 (1929).
In Re Boddington, L. R. 22, Ch. D. 597, 25 Ch. D. 685 (1883).
(But an annuity to her during widowhood never vests in her as she
never became testator's widow).
u McGraw's Estate, 228 Mich. 1, 199 N. W. 686 (1924). See 21 Ill. L.
Rev. 282 (1926). See also 21 Mich. L. Rev. 356 (1923); 33 Mich. L.
Rev. 637 (1935); 71 Pa. L Rev. 192 (1923); 32 Yale L.Jour. 627 (1923);
1 Page on Wills (2nd ed. 1926), Sec. 482; 25 A. L. R. 49; 37 A. L. R.
312; 42 A. L.R. 1289.
ILansing v.Haynes, 95 Mich. 16, 54 N. W. 699 (1893).
13Wirth v.Wirth, 149 Mich. 587, 113 N. W. 306 (1907) (Settlement
in lieu of alimony); Mc-raw's Estate, supra, n.11 (No settlement and
no alimony, the court having no power to grant it, but fact that it
was not asked for regarded as equivalent to a grant of alimony and
no distinction made between settlement and alimony).
14
Baaclce v. Baacke, supra, n. 9 (question of revocation of legacy
not before the court); Barlett's Estate, 108 Neb. 681, 190 N. W. 869
(1922); Martin's Estate, 109 Neb. 289, 190 N. W. 872 (1922) (revocation).
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But where the wife, on divorce, received a lump sum and the
household furniture, which may be regarded as a property settlement, and also a monthly allowance in the nature of alimony,
the testamentary provision for her was revoked. 15 Revocation
accords here with testator's presumed intent.'0 The couirt
thought, also, that the principle of revocation by implication was
elastic and should be applicable where new duties had arisen
and the wife was no longer an heir. The amount of the settlement was said to have been affected by the fact that she was an
heir. This recalls the early view in Illinois, that without statutory provision, marriage alone revokes a man's will because his
wife is an heir. 17
If the statute is construed to cut off the possibility of revocation by methods other than those expressly named, it follows
that where divorce is not included, divorce accompanied by a
settlement is not included,' 8 but where divorce alone works a
revocation, it follows that divorce accompanied by a property
settlement works a revocation. 19 Wnile alimony is sometimes
regarded as the equivalent of a settlement,20 it is, in its nature,
essentially different and at least one jurisdiction denies revocation where the payment of alimony was under compulsion of the
court and not by way of agreement. 2 '
Whether divorce and a property settlement accomplish an
implied revocation or not, it seems that the determination of the
issue is not based upon the supposed intention of the testator,
but depends upon a rule of law and added facts are generally
not pertinent.22 In some cases, however, certain extrinsic facts
2Barlett's Estate, supra, n. 14.
"AMartin'sEstate, supra, n. 14 (The idea of intention was rejected
and revocation became a rule of law).
27Tyler v. Tyler, 19 Ill. 151 (1857).

MBrannon's Estate, 295 P. 83 (Cal. App. 1931); Pacetti v.
Rowlinski, supra, n. 4; In Re Brown's Estate, 139 Ia. 219, 117 N. W.
260 (1908); Sue. of Cunningham, 142 La. 701, 77 So. 506 (1918);
AVenaber's Estate, supra, n. 4. In any event, a property settlement
accompanied by an action for divorce which action is discontinued
could scarcely work a revocation; Re Blanchard's Estate, 267 Mich. 189,
255 N. W. 190 (1934).
2"1Hall's Estate, 106 Minn. 502, 119 N. W. 219, 16 A. C. 541 (1909);
Battis Will, 143 Wis. L. Rev. 234; 126 N W. 9 (1910), 8 Ia. L. R. 281.
"Wirth v. Wirth, supra, n. 13.
in Re Brown's Estate, supra, n. 9.
=Lansing v. Haynes, supra, n. 12; McGraw's Estate, supra, n. 11;
Baacke v. Baacke, supra, n. 9; Martin's Estate, supra, n. 14; Battis
Will, supra, n. 18.
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have been admitted in evidence and their bearing upon testator's
23
intent has been considered by the court.
It has been pointed out 24 that there are, in fact, four classes
of cases: (a) Those where the decisions are based upon a statute
interpreted as excluding divorce as a method of revocation; (b)
Those where the statute expressly provides for revocation by
divorce; (c) Those where implied revocation is not limited to
such circumstances as were sufficient at common law, and the
statute expressly recognizes implied revocation;25 and (d) Those
where nothing is said about implied revocation and so divorce
is not necessarily excluded, 2 6 or included among circumstances
which imply revocation.
REVOCATION ENTIRE OR PARTIAL

In those states where divorce and a property settlement
constitute an implied revocation, is the entire will to be regarded
as revoked, or is the revocation applicable only to the provision
for the divorced spouse I It is to be recalled that at common
law revocation by implication arising from circumstances
affected the entire will. Also, those statutes which declare the
will is revoked of either a man or a woman by subsequent marriage, apply to the entire will.
On the other hand, if there is any analogy between such a
settlement and an advancement, it would seem that only the
legacy to the spouse is revoked, whether entirely or pro tanto.
Thus, where statutory provision is made for pretermitted
children and for those subsequently or posthumously born, it
does not cause an entire revocation, but rather it makes up to the
child what he would have received if there had been no will by
cutting down the shares of others. There is no sufficient reason
why the other provisions of the will should fail of effect just
because of the circumstances of the divorce of one beneficiary
3'Bartlett's Estate, supra, n. 14 (court considered facts that there
was no issue of the marriage and the property was largely inherited
and testator had near relatives); Pardee v. Grubbis, supra, n. 9 (question of revocation left to the jury).
315 Wis. L. Rev. 377 (1930).
2Lansing v. Haynes, supra, n. 12; Wirth v. Wirth, supra, n. 13;
McGraw's Estate, supra, n. 11; Baacke v. Baacke, supra, n. 9; Martin's
Estate, supra, n. 14; Battis Will, supra, n. 18; Bartlett's Estate, supra,
n. 14.
In Re Brownr's Estate, supra, n. 9; Card v. Alexander, supra, n. 6.
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and it is believed that the statutes in the two states declaring an
entire revocation of the will are ill conceived. The cases which
hold that the entire will is revoked are all cases where the whole
estate was left to the divorced spouse,2 7 with the possible exception of one,2 8 and even here such an inference may reasonably
be drawn. In Re Battis Will,2 9 only the legacy to the divorced
spouse was revoked.
THE SETTLEMENT AS A SATISFACTION

It is arguable that although divorce and a property settlement should not, apart from statute, be regarded as a revocation
of a gift to a spouse now divorced, still the settlement should be
a satisfaction of the gift, at least pro tanto. This suggestion
has not been followed,30 but the difficulty in the case which considered the matter arose in applying the doctrine of satisfaction
to residuary gifts. Much, however, may be said in behalf of a
settlement as a satisfaction. It is true that as regards strangers,
a gift inter vivos is not regarded as a satisfaction unless such
was the intention. In most cases, however, it seems fair to
assume that the gift to the spouse was occasioned by the relationship of husband and wife. The settlement was brought about
because of the severing of that relationship. There is reason,
accordingly, to assume, a connection between the testamentary
provision and the inter vivos provision. The nature of a residuary provision prevents it from being satisfied by an inter vivos
gift, but there is no sufficient reason why it should not be satisfied by a settlement on divorce, at least pro tanto.
A problem of conflict of laws might well be expected to
arise, though only one case so far has been found. Suppose a
will providing for the wife is executed in Washington, a state
which declares divorce alone, or divorce accompanied by a settlement is sufficient to revoke the provision. The divorce subsequently is procured in state of domicile where the will was
executed and subsequently the testator becomes domiciled and
dies in California, a state where this circumstance does not word
'Lansing v. Haynes, supra, n. 12; McGraw's Estate, supra, n. 11;
Barlett's Estate, supra, n. 14; Martin's Estate, supra, n. 14; Batis

WUZ, supra, n. 18.

Wirth v. Wirth, supra, n. 13.

Supra, n. 18.
"Re Brown's Estate, supra, n. 9.
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a revocation. Shall the divorced spouse take. 31 The answer
depends upon the nature of the revocatory act, and just when
it becomes such, whether at the time of performance, or at the
time of death. This question is a common one where the problem of revival arises.
Some acts, when accompanied by intent, are revoatory at
once, such a destruction or cancellation because the will no
longer exists in its original form and nothing can restore it, not
even re-execution or republication. On the other hand, revocation by a later will does necessarily take place when the later
will is executed and at common law the earlier will was revised
if the later revoking will happened to be itself revoked. An
early distinction arose in Connecticut 32 and spread to other
states, but is now repudiated at its place of origin, to the effect
that a will containing an express revoking clause took effect at
once, while a will merely inconsistent was revoked only at death.
It was said that in the latter case a revival of the earlier will
took place if the later will was repudiated. More accurately
speaking, the earlier will was not revoked by the later writing
at the time the act was performed but rather its primary position was temporarily usurped and the earlier will might later be
reinstated because no will really speaks till death, at which time
all validly executed and existing wills not then repudiated are
entitled to probate. It would seem that divorce, like cancellation or destruction, should operate at once. Certainly where
divorce revokes a will it does not operate like a subsequent writing which merely usurps the place taken by the prior will.
Divorce, like destruction, makes the testator intestate. If the
will is subsequently revalidated it must be through a revival
which operates without reference to the intention of the testator
and merely by the change of domicile. It is submitted that
change of domicile alone cannot, of itself, restore a revoked will.
If, however, the testator had been domiciled in California at the
date of the divorce but had become domiciled in Washington at
the time of his death, there would be the same result but the

1Pattersonv. Patterson,supra, n. 4. The view here expressed seems
to conflict with the Restatement of Conflicts of Laws, Sec. 37
"James v. Marvin, 3 Conn. 576 (1819) [overruled In Wh1ite/ aN v.
Halbingl, 98 Conn. 21, 118 A. 454 (1922)].
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divorce would not operate as a revocation until the change of
33
domicile had taken place.
(b) The divorce arises between a beneficiary and his spouse.
It is interesting to note that with one exception (case
of annulment for impotency) all the English cases are of this
class.
In all the decisions above noted it has been assumed that
the gift to a wife means a gift to the individual and that "wife"
or "husband" was mere descriptio personae.84 'Where a testator and his spouse are divorced, the gift to the spouse as "my
wife" or "my husband" is necessarily a gift to a definite person
who at the time is so described. If the gift should fail it is not
because the description is a condition of the gift. In cases of
the second class, there is less assurance that such term is merely
descriptive. It is commonly said, however, that if the bene-

'*See No. 75 Cal. Probate Code on revival (Deering 1931) which
clearly has no application. California held contra to the reasoning
above in Patterson v. Patterson, 64 Cal. App. 643, 222 P. 374 (1922).
See comments in 12 Cal. L. Rev. 579 (1924), 22 Mich. L. Rev. 838
(1924). See Be Reid, L. R. 1 P. & D. 74 (1867) (Will of T domiciled
in Scotland who later married and by the local law will was not revoked. Later, he became domiciled in England, where the will otherwise would have been revoked had it not been for the Lord Kingsdown
Act); Re Coburn, 30 N. Y. S. 383 (1894) (Will by unmarried woman
domiciled in New Jersey who later married there. In New Jersey
later marriage does not cause a revocation. She later became domiciled In New York, where subsequent marriage does revoke a prior
will. Held, will revoked. It is submitted that a correct result Is
reached here and that it is not analogous to the Patterson case and
that the note in 12 Cal. Law Rev. 579 erroneously assumes that the
only question involved is the matter of domicile. In fact, this case is
the converse of the Patterson case. There was no revocatory act In
New Jersey, but on reaching New York the act became revocatory by
the only law that could possibly be applicable. Suppose, however,
there had been a partial revocation by destructive act to the document
assumed to be possible in New Jersey, then the will would still have
been partially revoked to New York, even though evidence were available to establish the contents of the portion revoked, though New York
does not countenance partial revocation.
3
11n'Re Jones, supra, n. 4; Murphy v. Markis, supra, n. 4. Cf.
Card v. Alexander, supra, n. 6 (Held, that gift to wife In lieu of dower
and made conditional upon acceptance as such does not require the
beneficiary to be in such a position as to be entitled to dower). Where,
however, an annuity Is given to the wife to be paid her "so long as
she continues my widow and unmarried" if the marriage Is subsequently avoided, the beneficiary does not take because she cannot
fulfill the condition of the gift, I. e., being or continuing to be testator's widow (In Re Boddington, supra, n. 10). In Collard v. Collard,
67 Atl. 190 (N. J. Prerog. 1907) (held that gift to "my wife C" failed
if at the time she was not testator's wife because still married to
another).
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ficiary be designated both by name and by the term spouse, the
latter is merely descriptive. 3 5 Where, however, the spouse is
not mentioned by name and especially where the gift is to such
person as shall be the future spouse or during widowhood of a
named person (son or daughter or nephew, etc.), it is held that
the term "spouse" is a condition of the gift.30
We may conclude that at common law divorce of a testator
was not a circumstance which revoked either the will as a whole
or merely the provision for the divorced spouse. The English
attitude toward divorce has undoubtedly prevented this from
being a frequent ground of litigation there and in fact the only
decision bearing upon the matter is one involving annulment.
In this country the question of revocation arising from the circunstance of divorce has frequently occurred. It is rarely met
squarely by statute. It may be argued that the possibility of a
developing doctrine of revocation by implication should not be
overlooked. On the other hand, a legislative policy on the
matter is not difficult to formulate and such a regulation may
well be left to the law-making body. One may take his choice
of alternatives based upon his own views of social exigencies,
whether or not divorce should, as a matter of policy, revoke a
will pro tanto. Certainly it should not effect a total revocation.
Where, however, the spouses, on divorce, have agreed upon
a property settlement, which is fair to both and approved by
the court, legislation may well declare the provision for the
divorced beneficiary revoked. In the absence of legislation, such
a settlement may be regarded by the court construing the will as
being in the nature of an advancement. This does not apply to
3Knox v. Wells, 48 L. T. N. S. 655 (1864) (Annuity to son and to
son's wife, Elizabeth, Jointly. Son divorced his wife prior to testator's
death); Bullock v. Zlley, 1 N. J. Eq. 489 (1831) (Same, use of wife's
name emphasized); Mellon's Est., 28 W. N. C. 120 (Pa. 1891) (Same,
gift to T. W., husband of my daughter; provision not revoked by
divorce of T. W. from his wife).
"Re Morrieson, L. R. 40 Ch. D. 30 (1889). The earlier case, Bullmore v. Syyter, L. R. 22 Ch. D. 619 (1883) holding contra was not
followed. Steen v. Steen, 68 N. J. Eq. 472, 59 A. 675 (1905) (gift to
daughter, M, wife of my son, John. John not yet married to her at
death of T, M does not take); Bell v. Smalley, 45 N. J. Eq. 478, 18 A.
70 (1888) (gift to my son and to his wife, H, if she survives him,
during her widowhood. The gift is conditioned on widowhood, which
is prevented by divorce. Cf. Rogers v. Holister,156 Wis. 517, 146 N. W.
488 (1914) (gift to husband expressly conditioned upon his being T's
husband at her death, will being executed while divorce action was
pending).
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the case of alimony, which may not be a substantial portion of
the marital acquisitions. Social theory, if not legal theory,
tends to regard the wife as having an interest in the property
as such, acquired during the marriage by the industry of the
37
spouses.
Where the gift is not to the spouse of the testator but to the
spouse of a beneficiary, if such spouse is named as well as
described as spouse, divorce should not avoid the gift. If the
beneficiary is described only as spouse or relict of a named person there is more reason to regard the gift as conditioned upon
the language used.

w Divorce and Married Woman's Property Rights, Pierre Crabites,
12 A. B. A. Jour. 603 (1926). See Werner v. Werner, 59 Kan. 399
(1918) and Fuller v. Fuller, 33 Kan. 582 (1885); Krauter v. Krauter,
79 Okla. 30 (1920); Buckley v. Buckley, 50 Wash. 213 (1908); Estate
of BrinchTey, 96 Wash. 223 (1917); Knoll v. Knoll, 104 Wash.. 110
(1918). See further, Evans, Property Interests Arising from QuasiMarital Relations, 9 Corn. L. Quart. 247 (1924).

